June-July 2022
The second half of a paper delivered by the author at the Summer School
of Catholic Studies, held at Cambridge in July-August 1935.
Church and State: 5
THE CLAIMS OF THE CHURCH
CHURCH AND STATE
In considering the relations between Church and State we shall have in mind the ideal state of affairs in which we have a truly Christian State ready and willing to acknowledge, and to give effect to, the rights of the Church. When this is not the case, we have oppression of the Church which may sometimes go the length of active persecution. Though the ideal Catholic State is scarcely ever found in practice, yet the principles which we shall lay down remain true as enunciating the rights of the Church and history shows that the violation of these rights in the end acts with a boomerang effect upon the true welfare of the State itself. We shall not attempt to give further proof, from apologetics or revelation, of these principles since they are but a detailed explanation of what we have already said. We shall merely have to show that they do follow from the constitution of the Church as a juridically perfect society independent of every other. Three leading principles govern the relations between Church and State—the principles of distinction, of agreement or concord, and of indirect subordination of the State.
I. Distinction
We have already pointed out that the purposes of Church and State are quite distinct from each other: the scope of civil government being the temporal(1) welfare of the subject, that of the Church the ordering of men’s relations with Almighty God both in this life and in the life to come. It is true that the Church does not directly affect man after he has departed this life, but her whole activity is concerned with bringing men to union with God in this life in order to guide him safely to everlasting salvation, which is determined at death. Hence the ultimate scope of the Church is this after-death welfare of man.
(1) Mutual distinction and independence. It follows from what we have said that the Church and the Civil State are two perfectly distinct powers, each with its own sphere of activity. The necessary vicissitudes of nations (or temporal powers) also make it plain that the unchangeable and necessarily permanent authority of the Church cannot be linked up with any civil power. Again since the purpose of each is complete in itself, each is independent of the other: the State as independent of the Church as the Church is of the State. Leo XIII, in the encyclical Immortale Dei (Nov. 1, 1885) says: “Each [the Church and the State] is supreme in its own order: each is enclosed within definite boundaries which are determined by its respective nature and proximate purpose. Hence there is a sphere ascribed to each in which it exercises its activity by its own right.”
(2) Distinction of object. By “object” we understand, not the final purpose at which authority (ecclesiastical or civil) aims, but the proximate matter on which it may exercise its power or jurisdiction in pursuit of its final purpose. We have already shown that the final purposes of the two supreme societies are distinct and independent, but controversy has naturally raged most fiercely round the question of the respective objects of the two powers: for the question is more concrete and practical. It has been said by Gallican politicians that the object of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is purely spiritual and the means to be employed also purely spiritual. The rule for discerning the spiritual was supposed to be its invisibility: over external affairs the Church could have no power. The fourth of the pronouncements in the condemnation of the Synod of Pistoia (Aug. 28, 1794) reads:
The proposition which affirms that it is an abuse of the authority of the Church to bring it outside the sphere of doctrine and morals, to extend it to external things, and to exact by force what pertains to the persuasion of the heart; and also that still less may she exact obedience to her decrees by means of external force: in so far as the vague expression extend it to external things notes as an abuse of the authority of the Church the exercise of that power which was received from God and which the Apostles themselves used in setting up external discipline and furnishing it with sanctions: IS HERETICAL.(2)
The falsity of the Gallican and allied systems lies in the wrong criterion which is applied to ascertain the respective objects of ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction. The true norm of judgement is whether the object in question is a necessary means for the attainment of the purpose of the society. If it is something which is necessary for the religious good of men, then whether it is external or internal, visible or invisible, is of little moment: it is certainly the lawful object of the Church’s jurisdiction. The criterion applied by the Gallicans was, of course, one invented solely for the purpose of rendering the activity of the Church nugatory and securing the supremacy of the State over the Church. But it finally led its adherents into the ridiculous position of questioning the right of the Church to refuse absolution to the Jansenists. On the other hand, if rigidly applied, the principle would prevent the State from laying any obligation on the consciences of its subjects: a logical conclusion which the Gallicans would certainly not allow.
In deciding the competence of Church or State with regard to any particular object we must first see whether there is any positive divine law settling the question as, for instance, there is in the question of marriage between Christians. If such positive divine law is lacking, then we must turn to the general principle that the Church has a right to employ all the means necessary for the attainment of the object for which the Church was founded, namely, the sanctification and salvation of mankind.
It follows that many things, which at first sight appear to be of a purely temporal nature, will come under the jurisdiction of the Church. Thus the Church will have an independent right (not derived from the State) to the possession of material things (buildings, revenues, etc.); to excommunicate, if she thinks fit, and to enforce all the temporal consequences of complete excommunication; and so on. (With regard to this right of inflicting temporal punishment, it does not follow that, because we do not see the Church today using this right to any great extent, this right does not exist.) Hence we must note as a general conclusion, that it is misleading to speak of material and spiritual objects, internal and external, etc.: the only satisfactory division is into ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction.
II. Agreement or Concord
The clashes which have often arisen between Church and State, have been due to the fact that the subjects of the Church are also subjects of the Civil State and the State has very often not been willing that any part of man’s activity should come under any authority but its own. But there are parts of mail’s life in which both Church and State can rightly claim an interest, and, consequently, jurisdiction. These are technically called “mixed” matters or objects. Hence, if man is to be properly governed for his own greater good and for that of society as a whole, it is essential that in these matters Church and State should work in harmony and unison. This concord between the two powers should, in the first place, be negative in that neither power should hinder the other by word or act. But, since both should work together for man’s welfare, such negative concord is not enough. Since the Church never has had more than a very small measure of material force at her disposal (and today has none at all) and cannot therefore enforce her laws and decisions by material compulsion, the State (we are supposing a Christian State) has the obligation of giving material support to the Church. And, since the Church is an independent and divine authority, the State should mould her own legislation (in cases where it touches the same objects as Church legislation) in accordance with the rulings of the Church. Moreover, when it is necessary, the State should provide for the temporal needs of the Church and her ministers.
This protection of the Church by the State must not, however, be understood as an exercise of authority by the State over the Church, but as a duty of service to the Church. On the other hand it is the duty of the Church to give positive aid to the State by praying for its prosperity, by instructing men in their social duties to each other and to the State, by inculcating obedience to lawful authority. The State also has a right to expect from the Church that she shall use her authority to denounce and prohibit disobedience to the lawful authority of the State and even punish rebellious subjects with her censures. Moreover, Christian tradition has always regarded it as a duty of the Church to succour humanity in suffering, especially in time of public calamity, though at first sight this appears to be a purely temporal affair. The activity of religious orders in nursing and other charitable works is a testimony to the awareness of the Church to this obligation.
There was a time, not long passed, when the world felt very self-sufficient and independent of the Church. But that time has passed. The materialistic “man of science” may still feel that self-sufficiency, but practical men look to the Church to save society. They gloried proudly in material force, but that has broken down miserably as a means for securing society’s welfare and peace. It is pathetic to hear non-Catholics asking petulantly: “Why the pope doesn’t do something.” Yet it was they who snubbed him when he tried to stop them in the rush to perdition which has now come upon the world.
The principle of agreement or concord between Church and State was principally denied by the philosophic Liberalism which prevailed in most Continental countries until just before the Great War. This is not to be confused with English political Liberalism, though, on the Continent, the philosophic Liberalism we have referred to was also called Liberalism in politics. The roots of this Liberalism go back to the beginnings of Protestantism (which made religion an individual affair) and its complete evolution in the latter half of the nineteenth century was made possible by the change brought over Europe by the French Revolution with its glorification of the supreme secular State. The most absolute form of Liberalism regarded the Church as a subordinate society within the State. A milder form proclaimed the perfect parity of each power in its own sphere: as a consequence complete separation—“a free Church in a free State”—was advocated. Many Catholics have been tainted with Liberalism on account of the apparent impotence of the Church in face of the material power of the State. The errors of Liberalism were condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX (1864).
In our modern society very often the best means of securing peaceful and smooth co-operation between Church and State is a Concordat. This is an agreement between Church and State regulating their mutual relations. Generally in these agreements the Church cedes some rights to the State (such as the nomination of bishops) in return for a definite acknowledgement of her own rights and promises of legal support. Often conflicts arise out of such agreements because some States do not seem to see the binding force of such pacts on themselves. But on the whole the Holy See regards Concordats as making for the easier and more effective exercise of her own jurisdiction.
III. Indirect Subordination of the State
This is a principle which to the modem non-Catholic mind is very unpalatable and even ridiculous. Their scorn arises from their theory of the absolute supremacy of the State. Yet this theory is quite false as we have seen. If the two powers, Church and State, are both supreme and independent powers, and if (as we have pointed out) the matter over which both rightly exercise jurisdiction is often common ground, it follows inexorably that in case of disagreement one should have the right to prevail. Since “there is no authority that is not from God, and the existing authorities are appointed by God” (Rom. 13:1) there must be an order or gradation in these authorities. And since the Church, founded by Christ, has the nobler and higher end, which is man’s eternal and ultimate welfare, it cannot be the secondary power which in these cases of conflict should give way. Hence it is the duty of the State in such cases to give way to the Church.
There have been those, such as Augustine Trionfo (d. 1320) and Alvares Pelayo, O.F.M. (d. 1352), who held that the Church has direct jurisdiction in all temporal matters and that secular rulers are merely the pope’s delegates. This teaching was never widespread and is now entirely rejected by theologians. The power that we claim for the Church is an indirect power in temporals over the State and that only in cases where the same object is touched by both powers. In spiritual matters, of course, the State is directly subject to the Church, as e.g., in the matrimonial contract between Christians which is a sacrament.
It is argued that, if this is so, the Christian State enjoys less power than a non-Christian State and is therefore in an inferior condition. The mentality of this objection fails to grasp the fact that the State should not glory in some mythical kind of freedom, but that the sole reason for its existence is to promote the welfare of its subjects. If God has founded His Church, as He has, to help man and to help the State, then the activity of the Church cannot but be beneficial both to the individual and to the State. Hence it is to the good of the State to work in conjunction with the Church and to submit to the guidance of the Church in those matters which they have in common.
It has been, and always will be, objected that this claim of indirect subordination is a pretext for interference of the Church in purely temporal affairs. But no impartial student of history can deny that the interference has been (to put it mildly) generally an interference of the State in purely spiritual matters. Indeed, as most will admit, if the State had been willing to listen to the advice of the Church the world would be a happier place even from the point of view of purely material welfare.
Let it be emphasised again that the Church does not in any case claim direct subordination of the State in temporal affairs, but only indirect, that is to say, subordination on account of the religious issue involved.
THE UNAM SANCTUM
It would be extremely interesting to analyse some of the outstanding pronouncements of the Church on the present subject and investigate their exact meaning, but that is impossible in a short essay. An attempt has been made in the preceding pages to give an accurate résumé of the teaching of the Church. There is, however, one document, the Bull Unam Sanctam of Boniface VIII, which proved a storm-centre at the time it was issued and has ever since been pointed to as the classic example of the outrageous nature of the Church’s claims. It has been wrenched from its historical setting in order that its meaning might be distorted: though, even if we had nothing but the text of the Bull itself, its evident meaning goes no further than the doctrine which we have expounded in this essay.
In 1285 Philip the Fair succeeded to the throne of France. A man of uncontrollable ambition, he was the great obstacle the pope, Boniface VIII, met with in his efforts to restore peace in Europe. He was not satisfied with his temporal power, but wished to dominate the Church as well. Helped by his counsellor, Peter Flotte, he conducted a campaign of calumny against the pope, winning over many of the clergy. It was a long, bitter and acrimonious struggle. I leave others to recount the details. When in 1302 a synod was convoked to be held in Rome, the clergy had so far recovered their mental equilibrium that French archbishops and bishops to the number of thirty-nine attended. It was this synod which drew up the Bull Unam Sanctum, the actual text of which is said to come from the pen of Giles of Rome, an eminent canonist and theologian.
Hence it is wrong to think of the Unam Sanctum as an angry rejoinder of Pope Boniface, composed in a fit of anger. That Boniface was capable of saying and writing angry things, we are not concerned to deny. But the Bull was not such a retort. It was the considered pronouncement of a synod in which there were thirty-nine French bishops. Nor is it a document which the Holy See has ever in any way retracted. It was confirmed by the Fifth Lateran Ecumenical Council in 1513. The point in its teaching, to which exception is taken, is reaffirmed in the Syllabus of Pius IX. Here are the passages of the Bull which bear on the present subject:
The Gospel tells us that in the Church and in its power there are two swords, viz., the spiritual and the temporal. ... The latter is wielded for the Church, the former by the Church: the former by the priesthood, the latter by kings and soldiers, but by the bidding and consent of the priesthood. But the sword must be under the sword and temporal authority be subject to the spiritual power. ... For in truth the spiritual power instructs (instituere habet) the temporal power and judges it, if it be not good. ... Hence we declare, affirm and define that it is of necessity to salvation for every human being to be subject to the Roman Pontiff.
The part which we have italicised is the de fide definition of the Bull but the rest contains the undoubted teaching of the Church. One or two points call for some comment. The assertion that the temporal sword is wielded “by the bidding and consent of the priesthood,” does not mean that the whole sphere of temporal jurisdiction is directly subject to the Church, but that when it is exercised “for the Church” this is done by the State as a duty at the request of the Church. That this is the true meaning of the passage is clear from the declaration of Boniface VIII in a consistory that it was falsely attributed to him that “we have commanded the king to recognise that he holds his kingdom from us. For forty years we have studied law and we know that there are two powers appointed by God. Who should then, or can, believe that we entertain, or have entertained, such a stupid absurdity? We declare that in no way do we wish to usurp the jurisdiction of the king.”
Hence when the Bull says that the spiritual power “instructs” the temporal power, the meaning cannot be that temporal rulers derive their authority from the pope and we must take the word instituere to mean “instruct” or “guide” as we have translated it.
The meaning of the de fide definition of the Bull is quite clear. It simply enunciates the dogmatic truth that the Roman Catholic Church is the one true Church of Christ; that all its members (i.e., all who are baptised) are subject to its Supreme Head on earth, the Roman Pontiff, in matters of faith and morals; and that God has commanded all men to be members of His Church.
FOOTNOTES:
(1) This is mainly material but not entirely so, for even in his temporal life man has intellectual activities (which are “spiritual”) which are not religious. The use of the word “spiritual” as synonymous with “religious ” is very misleading and gives rise to much confusion.
(2) An excellent account of Gallicanism by M. Dubruel is to be found in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris, 1923, sqq.) s.v. Gallicanisme.